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ixIntroduction
The original title of this thesis was `Amending the Racial Wage Gap, What Helps
and What Does not?'. However the path to amending the racial gap suered several
diversions that extended the scope of this thesis and therefore its title.
The path starts where wages are paid, the labour market. The labour market is not a
place where everybody knows everything about every other person; perfect information,
as it is called in economics, does not exist. Employers, when choosing how to allocate
responsabilities and how much to pay for each responsability, are aware that they could
be hiring the wrong person.
The consequence of imperfect information to rms is called adverse selection and
leads to the skill composition of the hired sample being lower than desired by the rm. In
fact, adverse selection might provoke, in extreme cases, a cessation of economic activity
in a market. Fortunately economists have found ways to ameliorate this problem. In
this thesis I examine two well-known solutions. Both solutions are related to how the
rm can change its actions to minimise the impact of asymmetric information.
One of the solutions requires the existence of an education system. This solution is
based on the expectation by rms that workers will send signals about their skill set
whilst still in school. The best performers will each have a stronger signal and employers
will be keener to hire them for positions of a more demanding nature. The solution just
described is called signaling and it allows employers to allocate more demanding jobs
to workers with better signals. I refer to this solution as rms screening the applicants'
education choices or signalling.
The second solution developed requires the output a worker produces to be ex-post
observable -with some degree of accuracy- by the employer. When this is possible, rms
change the wage structure by conditioning ex-post payments on actual productivity.
The latter means underskilled workers self-select themselves out of the demanding jobs.
Observable output, thus, allows the rm to pay piece-rate. In this thesis we refer to this
solution as rms screening the workers' occupational choices or in short self-selection.
Notice in the literature on this topic self-selection is named screening. We believe
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this is unfortunate because both signalling and self-selection involve some sort of screen-
ing by the rm.
Chapter 1 of this thesis tackles the adverse selection problem. It presents a model
of adverse selection where the two most common solutions to this problem, screening
of educational and occupational choices, are put together creating a model of double
screening.
Models incorporating both solutions are appealing as they more realistically reect
what is observed in data. Empirically, rms seem to condition initial wages on signals
and later wages on variables correlated with actual productivity. This is known as
employers' learning. I also assume employers in this model have a belief (which might
be wrong) with regards to how many workers are able to perform demanding tasks
properly. This assumption is added to observe the evolution of the belief over time
and how long it takes to be equal to the actual share of skilled workers. In summary,
chapter 1 lays down a model of the labour market which is close to the hypothesis of
employers' learning.
Chapter 2, in turn, provides three applications of the double screening model with
one group. First it explains how the possibility of double screening impacts the contracts
that rms oer and the assignment of jobs. In addition I change the quality of the ex-
ante signals and the accuracy of the rms' observations of workers' productivity. These
changes allow us to better understand how the rm chooses the prot maximising
contract.
Second, I use the double screening model to simulate income and welfare distribu-
tions. The income distribution is not immune to the screening mechanism chosen by
the rms. Furthermore I link the availability of screening methods with the US actual
income distribution and its evolution. In particular I think that the observed increase
in piece-rate payments might be behind the changes to the US income distribution.
The last point of chapter is an analysis of the inuence of market structure on human
capital accumulation. Market structure refers to how many rms exist in a given market
producing the same good. When applied to the labour market the word producing
is replaced by hiring. The extremes of this classication are perfect competition, a
situation where many employers co-exist, and a monopsony, where there exists only
one employer.
The last chapter uses the the double screening model with two groups workers that
can be recognized because of some physical characteristic like skin colour. The rst
part of this chapter allows the rms to use an applicant's physical characteristics when
setting contracts and allocating tasks.3
I show results from a simulation where one of the groups is believed by the rm
to be inferior (in productivity terms). Two lessons emerge. Firstly, convergence in
earnings and beliefs between the two groups is almost immediate, not taking more than
2 generations to occur. Secondly, the more powerful is the ability of the rm to observe
performance the faster the above-mentioned convergence is. The reason for the faster
convergence is the rms' ability to set group-specic hiring strategies. Firms condition
wage more on the performance of the applicants who belong to the disfavoured group;
that increases the incentives of workers in the disfavoured group to invest in human
capital and thus closes the earnings and beliefs' gap faster.
The last part of chapter 3 contains applied research on the black/white income gap
in the US. It starts by asking why the exercise carried out in the rst part of the same
chapter suggests quick earnings convergence between groups yet we do not see it in
reality. We follow the literature on US racial history to note that black and whites
do not enjoy the same family backgrounds and schooling opportunities. We adapt
the model to include these dierences by assuming, rst, dierent investment cost
distributions. Cost that is meant to represent family background. Second, we assume
that investment in human capital rewards more whites than blacks. More rewarding in
terms of productivity to perform demanding jobs and in terms of the schooling signal
observed by employers. I show that this dierences in opportunities can actually explain
the persistence of the US racial gap.
Finally we scrutinise the role played by one important policy, the ban on using race
when hiring, as stems from the Title VII of the US civil rights act of 1964. I show that
the easier it is for rms to observe the actual productivity of workers the more damaging
the ban for the disfavoured group is. This result, even though shocking at rst, has
a very simple rationale; banning the use of race when hiring reduces the incentives to
invest for the disfavoured group. The latter implies a reduction in the next generation's
investment rate and as a direct consequence on performance in the labour market. In
particular I show that, over the course of three generations, the economy where the use
of race is partially excluded from hiring decisions from being used in contracts closes
the income gap by 15 percentage points while on economy where the use of race is
allowed closes the gap by 28 percentage points.Chapter 1
A model of double screening
1.1 Introduction
Economists have long been aware of the importance of asymmetric information in the
proper functioning of markets. The labour market is not an exception as employers
might not have full information about workers' productivity. The problems arising
from this lack of information are split in two categories, adverse selection (unknown
workers' type) and moral hazard (unknown workers' eort). This chapter deals with
how adverse selection is solved, while dismissing issues of moral hazard as they are out
of the scope of this research.
Under adverse selection rms lack knowledge about the actual ability of workers. It
is generally assumed actual ability is a worker's private information and thus hard to
observe quickly and reliably. Not knowing the workers' ability means, in principle, that
an employer has to believe a worker's declaration of his ability. Since wages are normally
higher for high ability workers, low ability ones have an incentive to pretend otherwise.
This might induce, if the asymmetry is severe enough, a cessation of economic activity
as shown by Akerlof (1970). The problem so far is that sometimes workers cannot be
trusted. Some of their -observable- actions, though, may carry information correlated
with their actual ability.
As noted in Riley's (2001) survey two such common observable variables are the
workers' educational and performance choices of workers. The former gives space to
the signaling literature pioneered by Spence (1973), where rms screen workers' educa-
tional choices and allocate tasks more eciently; the latter was initially approached by
Rothschild & Stiglitz (1977) and uses the ability to screen the performance of workers
to set wages that induce workers to self-select themselves onto the right task. In this
chapter the objective is to merge both approaches so that I obtain a model of double
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screening.
The importance of double screening can be observed in empirical studies like the
ones of Altonji & Pierret (2001) or Lang & Siniver (2011). These two papers show
that even though starting salaries do depend on easily available information (years of
schooling, name of the school attended), experienced workers' earnings tend to depend
on actual ability. This nding suggests that rms are capable of learning a worker's
ability and thus both types of screening are used at the same time.
The use of signals arising from the education system as a screening mechanism by
rms is pervasive but performance pay is also becoming a common feature in high
skilled workers' contracts as pointed out in Lemieux et al. (2009). These authors also
point that income inequality increases in jobs aected by performance pay.
The main contribution os this chapter is to oer a rigorous theory of the labour
market where employers' learning is modelled. This theory allows us to learn from the
optimal screening behaviour of rms and to provide some insights into the variables
aecting it.
1.2 The model
I develop an overlapping generations model with asymmetric information in the labour
market. The asymmetry is generated by an employer who does not know the produc-
tivity of his employees, which is the private information of the workers. This form of
asymmetric information gives rise to a problem of adverse selection as the one shown
in Akerlof (1970). Akerlof, in his paper, shows that assymetric information could even
cause the cessation of market acitivities. Typical remedies to the problem of assymetric
information include the use of signals from the education system and ex-post observa-
tions of workers' on-the-job performance, hereinafter referred as ex-ante and ex-post
signals, respectively.
The work developed in this chapter has the spirit of Coate & Loury's (1993) signal-
ing model, although wages are endogenous following Moro & Norman's (2004) general
equilibrium model. A crucial innovation that is not present in the two papers just men-
tioned is the ability of the rms to condition wages on observed performance. When
allowing the use of ex-ante and ex-post signals by rms a model of double screening
arises. This feature has scarcely been utilised in the literature but is implemented by
Gall et al. (2006).
The model developed in this chapter also features endogenous human capital accu-
mulation. This part is crucial to show the eects of rms' current hiring policies onCHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 6
tomorrow's educational choices. In this model workers have the typical motivations for
a worker investing in human capital1; they expect stronger signals and to become more
productive when handling demanding tasks.
The description of the model starts with the agents (workers and rms) and their
strategic interactions. Then a denition of equilibrium is provided and a method for
how to solve the equilibrium with one and two groups, respectively.
1.2.1 Workers
Demographic structure
Every period a unit continuum of workers is born. Workers belong to one of the two
existent groups, g 2 fW;Bg. The size of each group is given by W and B with respect
to groups W and B. W + B = 1. I assume that group identity is easily observable
and public knowledge.
Each generation of workers lives for three periods. They represent the workers'
youth, adulthood and retirement. Workers are endowed with one unit of time which is
inelastically supplied in their adulthood.
Types and skills
The type of the workers is given by the cost of investing in human capital. This
disutility, denoted , is randomly drawn from the distribution F
g
 whose shape might
depend on the group.
When young, a worker willing to face the cost  and invests in his human capital
becomes high skilled (H), otherwise he becomes low skilled (L). I denote the investment
in human capital with an indicator function; I = 1 if a worker invests and I = 0 if he
does not. The cost of investing in human capital is assumed to enter the utility function
linearly.2 Finally I denote the share of each group's high skilled individuals by g.
Preferences
Workers derive utility from consuming during their adulthood and their retirement.3
Their preferences over consumption are summarised by an isoelastic utility function
1See Becker (1975) or Spence (1973)
2This is assumed for simplicity. It does not aect qualitatively the results shown.
3They do not explicitly consume while young. I can assume current adults feed the new generation
and that is embedded in their utility.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 7
that weights consumption during adulthood ca and old age co,
u(c
a;c
o) =
ca1    1
1   
+ 
co1    1
1   
  , (1.1)
where  is the coecient of relative risk aversion and  the discount rate. I assume work-
ers face a borrowing constraint. Given wages when they are adults and old, fwa;wog,
the indirect utility function -net of investment costs- is dened as:
V (c
a;;c
o;) = Max
ca;co u(w
a;w
o) (1.2)
Outside options
High skilled and low skilled workers have outside options denoted by f UH;g;  UL;gg for
g 2 fw;bg. Outside options reect the utility that these workers could obtain if they
put their labour back in the market.
1.2.2 Firms
There are two innitely-lived rms competing  a la Bertrand. These rms are myopic4
because they only take into account current prot when deciding their actions. At time
0, I assume that rms hold beliefs on the share of high skilled workers in each group
fe w
0 ;e b
0g.
Production
Firms produce output, Y , that represents a nal consumption good. Production of the
good requires the performance of both a simple and a complex task. The technology
that rms use to produce the consumption good is represented by a CES function
mapping complex and simple tasks' eciency units of labour fY : <2
+ ! <g into
output,
Y = A(C
 + (1   )S
)
1= ; (1.3)
where A stands for the total factor productivity,  is the output share associated with
the complex task and  determines the degree of substitutability between the eciency
units of each task. The production function satises the Inada conditions,
Lim
C!1
@Y
@C
= Lim
S!1
@Y
@S
= 0, and (1.4)
4The myopia is assumed to prevent the model being in steady state all the time. By doing this I
obtain dynamics to the steady state.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 8
Lim
C!0
@Y
@C
= Lim
S!0
@Y
@S
= 1. (1.5)
The complex task is done more eciently by high skilled workers (with roductivity
A
g
h) than by low skilled workers (with productivity A`), with A
g
h > A` > 0 for g 2
fW;Bg. On the contrary, both types are equally ecient at doing the simple task,
with producitivities equal to 1.5 The eciency units of labour for each task are made
of the mass of high (H) and low (L) skilled workers performing those tasks times their
respective productivities. Note the superscripts c and s reect the task performed.
C =
X
g2fW;Bg
A
g
hH
c;g + A`L
c (1.6)
S = H
s + L
s (1.7)
Information
Firms have a belief, e g, -that might be wrong- about the proportion of high skilled
workers in each group, yet they do not know, within a group, who is high skilled and
who is not. This information asymmetry generates a problem of adverse selection. To
counter this problem I assume that rms observe two noisy signals that are correlated
with the skill level. Adverse selection is, as a result, partially mitigated because rms
have the opportunity to use the signals to improve the skill composition of the workers
on each task.
Ex-ante signal: The rst of these signals is denoted . This signal is randomly
drawn from one of two distributions F
g
h or F`. High skilled workers send a signal drawn
from F
g
h while low skilled workers draws it from F`, with F
g
h rst order stochastically
dominating F`. Employers observe this signal at the moment of hiring workers. The
ex-ante signal is best thought as a combination of factors that are observable by a rm
when meeting an applicant. These factors might include the CV, the job interview or
the neighbourhood where he lives, among others.
Ex-post signal: The second signal, denoted y, is generated after the completion of
a complex task by a worker. The ex-post signal takes on two values, `pass' or `fail'
5This assumption does not aect the nal result. The rms' objective of matching high skilled
workers with complex tasks would remain unaltered had I assumed low skilled workers were more
productive than high skilled workers at doing simple tasks.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 9
y 2 (p;f). High skilled workers performing the complex task send out a `pass' signal
with probability6 one. On the contrary, the low skilled workers who perform the complex
task send out `pass' signals with probability  2 (0;1). I refer to  as the probability of
fooling the rm. Low skilled workers are heterogeneous in the probability of obtaining
a `pass' signal as  is a random variable drawn from the distribution F.
Hiring game
When workers become adults they randomly choose one of the two existing rms.7 At
this point there is an exchange of information between the rm and the worker; the
worker sends a signal, , to the employer and, at the same time, he gets to know the
probability, , of obtaining a `pass' signal if he ended up doing complex tasks.
Worker chooses Firm oers Worker takes
rm contract decision
S
(ws;0;S)
S
Reject
C
Accept
(p()wc;wpjp;C)
 !
  
Then, the rm oers a contract that involves either performing simple or complex
tasks. Contracts in our setting are dened as follows:
Denition A contract between a worker and a rm is dened as a triplet fwa;wo;Tg
that species the ex-ante wage wa, the ex-post wage wo and the task T 2 fC;Sg that
will be performed8.
For the simple task the rm oers a xed ex-ante wage wa = ws and no9 ex-post
wage wo = 0. None of the payments in the simple task contract depend on the signals
because rms know with certainty the workers' productivity when doing simple tasks.
6This is a simplication that does not aect the results. We could assume a lower probability
insofar the signal remains informative.
7Firms are assumed to be identical. This means all rms receive the same signal  from each worker
and it is equally easy -or dicult- for a worker to receive a `pass' signal from any of them.
8In terms of timing wa is given when a worker starts his adulthood and wo as soon as he becomes
old and retires.
9The rm has no incentive to postpone the payment and so we make the calculations simpler by
taking away this option.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 10
The contract for the complex task uses, though, both signals. The form of the ex-ante
wage is given by wa = p(;e g)wc, where p(;e g) is the Bayesian posterior probability
of being high skilled given the group and the signal,
p(;e 
g) =
e gfh()
e gfh() + (1   e g)fl()
: (1.8)
In turn, the ex-post wage is given by:
w
o =
(
wp if y = p
0 otherwise ;
)
(1.9)
where wp 2 <+ and rms pay wp conditional on the ex-post signal being a `pass'. The
structure of the ex-ante payment in the complex task contract is taken from Moro &
Norman (2003) and I keep it to allow for comparability in the results.
Firms can potentially use the ex-ante and ex-post signals to improve the sorting of
high skilled workers into complex tasks; this is done in two ways called Firms' Selection
(FS) and Self-Selection (SS). On the one hand Firms' Selection refers to the use of
hiring thresholds for each group. Hiring thresholds, f w;  bg, represent the minimum
signal a worker needs to be oered a complex task job. Since those who invest in human
capital receive, on average, higher signals, setting hiring thresholds may allow the rms
to attract more high skilled workers to the complex task.
On the other hand, Self-Selection refers to type revelation by low skilled workers
initially assigned to a complex task. We denote as FD the proportion of low skilled
workers invited to perform the complex task and who accept the invitation, hereinafter
called `deceivers'. Firms can decrease the size of FD with the help of contracts by
making deception less atractive10.
Given hiring thresholds and contracts for simple and complex tasks, I obtain the
mass of high and low skilled workers rms expect to hire for each task,
H
c =
X
g2fW;Bg
[1   F
g
h( 
g)]e 
g ; L
c =
X
g2fW;Bg
[1   Fl( 
g)](1   e 
g)F
g
D (1.10)
H
s =
X
g2fW;Bg
F
g
h( 
g)e 
g ; L
s =
X
g2fW;Bg
Fl( 
g)(1 e 
g)+[1 Fl( 
g)](1 e 
g)[1 F
g
D]:
(1.11)
In the above denitions H and L stand, respectively, for the mass of high and low skilled
10Think, for instance, of higher ws or wp.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 11
workers while the superscripts c,s, stand for the task to which they are allocated. As an
example, to obtain the expected mass of high skilled workers performing the complex
task I multiply the perceived share of high skilled in society e g times the mass of high
skilled with signals above the hiring threshold [1 F
g
h( g)]. Calculations for the mass of
low skilled on each task follow a similar logic. It should be noted that some low skilled
workers initially assigned to a complex task may end up performing simple tasks after
revealing their type (the fraction [1   F
g
D]).
Prot
The prot function consists of the revenue earned by the rm minus the wages paid to
the workers. Note the price of the consumption good is normalised to 1 and prot is
P( ;w) = Y ( ;w)  
X
g
!
g( ;w). (1.12)
Output is dened in equation 1.5; even though the expression in 1.5 does not explicitly
depend on either wages or hiring thresholds it does so implicitly through the eciency
units. The expected payroll is calculated assuming that the law of large numbers
applies. In particular, the ex-ante payments for workers performing the complex task
are calculated by multiplying the expected posterior probability of those who accept the
job times the base payment wc. The ex-post, or performance payments are calculated
by multiplying the expected mass of workers with a `pass' signal times the individual
payment wp. Finally, workers doing the simple task are paid ws. The formula to
calculate the payroll is
!
g = w
c;g (E[p()]
g
I=1H
c;g + E[p()]
g
I=0L
c;g) + w
p;g (H
c;g + E[]
g
D=1L
c;g) + w
s;gN
s;g,
(1.13)
where E[p()]
g
I=1 is the expected Bayesian posterior probability of investors doing com-
plex tasks from group g and E[]
g
D=1 is the expected probability of obtaining a pass in
the ex-post signal by low skilled workers doing the complex task.
Updating of beliefs: I assume the actual share of high skilled workers can be recov-
ered by the rm after the tasks are done. Firms use this information to update their
current beliefs as follows:
e 
g
t+1 = qe 
g
t + (1   q)
g
t with q 2 (0;1) (1.14)CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 12
where q is an exogenous smoothing parameter and g is the current share of high skilled
workers of the gth group. This updating rule generalises the one used in Coate & Loury
(1993) and I keep it for its simplicity.11 Note that the rm posseses private information
about former workers but, since the information is learnt after they have left the rms
it does not matter for the analysis.
1.3 Equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium of the economy is Bayes-Nash. Since the properties of the
equilibrium dier depending on the time span I dene the equilibrium in the short-run
and in the steady state. The dierence lies in the correctness of the rms' beliefs with
respect to the workers' investment rate. These beliefs can be wrong in short-run but
not in the steady state. Since the short-run equilibrium contains the steady state as a
sub-case I dene it rst.
Equilibrium in the short-run: The equilibrium in the short-run is characterised
by the agents maximising their objective functions in addition to the rms updating
their beliefs.
Denition Given a set of initial beliefs, fe w
t ;e b
tg, allocations, f^ ca;i;^ co;ig 8i 2 (0;1),
along with workers' strategies, f^ Ii; ^ Dig 8i 2 (0;1), rms' strategies, f^  W; ^  Bg, out-
side options, f^  UH;g; ^  UL;ggg2fW;Bg, and wages f ^ wc;g; ^ wp;g; ^ ws;ggg2fW;Bg constitute a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium if they are such that:
i Given market outside options f^  UH;g; ^  UL;ggg2fW;Bg and rms' beliefs, rms' strategies
f^  W; ^  Bg and wages f ^ wc;g; ^ wp;g; ^ ws;ggg2fW;Bg solve the rms' problem.
ii 8i 2 (0;1), given rms' strategies, f^  W; ^  Bg, and wages, f ^ wc;g; ^ wp;g; ^ ws;ggg2fW;Bg,
workers' strategies, f^ Iig, solve the workers' investment problem.
iii 8i 2 (0;1), given rms' strategies, f^  W; ^  Bg, and wages, f ^ wc;g; ^ wp;g; ^ ws;ggg2fW;Bg,
workers' strategies, f ^ Dig, solve the workers deceiving problem.
iv Firms' expected prot given their beliefs are 0.
v Beliefs are updated according to equation 1.13.
11See Kim & Loury (2009) for a version of Coate & Loury with forward looking agents.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 13
Steady state: A steady state of this economy is characterised by a sequence of short-
run equilibria such that the state variables (rms' beliefs) remain constant. A formal
denition follows.
Denition The steady state of the economy is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium constituted
by outside options, f^  UH;g; ^  UL;ggg2fw;bg, and rms' beliefs, fw
t ;b
tg, such that the wages
f ^ wc;g; ^ wp;g; ^ ws;ggg2fW;Bg, and the hiring thresholds, f^  W; ^  Bg, set by the rms cause the
workers' investment rates to be W = e W;B = e B.
1.4 Solving for the equilibrium
This section solves for the equilibrium of the model with double screening. I show how
the agents solve their problems in the same order as the decisions are taken for a given
generation of workers. First rms, given their beliefs, decide the wages and the hiring
thresholds. Workers then use the rms' actions to decide whether to invest in their
own human capital or not. Lastly, low skilled workers who are invited to perform the
complex task decide whether or not to deceive the rm.
Firms set contracts
0
and thresholds
Young choose
human capital
Workers choose
1
to deceive or not
Firms learn w;b
2
and update beliefs
1.4.1 The rm's problem
Since the two rms in the economy are identical I show the behaviour of a representative
rm behaving as in perfect competition. Given beliefs fe w
t ;e b
tg and outside options
f UH;g;  UL;ggg2fW;Bg the rm solves,
Max
 g;wc;g;wp;g;ws;g P = Y ( ;w)   !( ;w) (1.15)
subject to four individual rationality constraints,
 U
H;g  [1   Fh( 
g)]V
h;c
E + Fh( 
g)V
s IR:H
g (1.16)CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 14
 U
L;g  [1   Fl( 
g)]V
l;c
E F
g
D + [1   Fl( 
g)]V
s[1   F
g
D] + Fl( 
g)V
s IR:L
g (1.17)
and four incentive compatibility constraints,
V
h;c  V
s 8 >  
g IC:H
g (1.18)
V
s  V
l;c(;); for some (;) IC:L
g (1.19)
where output is given by equation 1.5 and the expected payroll of the rm is dened in
equation 1.13. In addition, four Individual Rationality and four Incentive Compatibility
constraints must be satised. On the one hand, the four IR constraints reect that the
rm must oer at least the outside option for a worker to choose that rm as his
workplace, i.e. it is an ex-ante constraint. The IR constraints are group and skill
dependant. Also note that the value functions should have a group superscript since
wages may dier between groups; these are omitted for clarity.
The right hand sides of equations 1.16 and 1.17 reect the expected utility of,
respectively, a high and a low skilled worker, before taking the decision of whether
to invest in human capital or not. In terms of notation, value functions are assigned
superscripts depending on the task fc;sg and the skill of the worker fh;lg. More
specically, V
h;c
E is the expected12 utility that a worker would obtain by investing if
he were chosen to perform the complex task. Likewise, V
l;c
E is the expected utility a
worker would obtain if he did not invest but was given the opportunity to perform the
complex task and accepted a contract to do so -a deceiver-. Lastly V s is the utility13
drawn from performing simple tasks.
On the other hand, I add four IC constraints to the problem of the rm, one per
group and skill. First, the IC.H constraints make sure high skilled workers assigned
to the complex task do not have an incentive to pretend to be low skilled and thus to
switch to the simple task. Then, the IC.L constraints have the opposite purpose; they
are intended for low skilled workers assigned to the complex task to leave and perform
the simple one instead.
It is important to notice that IC:Hg is, in equilibrium, satised and thus no high
skilled worker assigned to a complex task would pretend to be low skilled. This is
not neccesarily true in the case of the IC:Lg, and a semi-separating equilibrium is
12Expected because the ex-ante wage depends on the signal and the signal itself is a random variable.
13There is no expectation as this value is known with certainty by the workers.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 15
normally14 achieved. Only in special cases15 would this constraint be satised for all
low skilled workers and a pure separating equilibrium would exist.
1.4.2 Workers' problems.
Workers' payos depend on whether they become high skilled or not, and -only for
the low skilled workers who are invited to perform the complex task- on whether they
deceive their employer or not. Next we show how these decisions are taken and aggre-
gated.
Human capital decision: Young workers make their human capital acquisition deci-
sions based on their investment costs and expected future earnings. I dene the benet
of investing as

g = E[U
gjI = 1]   E[U
gjI = 0] g 2 (W;B), (1.20)
where E[UgjI = 1] and E[UgjI = 0] are the expected utility of a member of group
g who, respectively, has and has not invested in human capital. Given information
on contracts and hiring thresholds workers compare the payos of investing and not
investing. This is done by weighting the value at each state by its respective probability.
E[U
gjI = 1] = [1   Fh( 
g)]V
h;c
E + Fh( 
g)V
s g 2 (W;B) (1.21)
E[U
gjI = 0] = [1 Fl( 
g)]V
l;c
E F
g
D+[1 Fl( 
g)]V
s[1 F
g
D]+Fl( 
g)V
s g 2 (W;B) (1.22)
Every worker whose benet to investing is higher than his utility cost acquires human
capital. The share of each group's workers that choose to acquire human capital, g, is
computed as the mass of workers whose investment cost is below the benet to invest
g = F
g
(g).
Deceiving decision: Workers invited by the rm to perform complex tasks have to
decide whether to accept it or to reject the oer. The incentive compatibility constraint
IC:H ensures all high skilled workers assigned to the complex task will accept the
invitation. On the contrary, low skilled workers invited to perform complex tasks must
decide whether they want to deceive the rm or not. Given workers' knowledge of their
14Suppose V s = V l;c, 8(;), then V s = V h;c, 8 and no worker wants to perform complex tasks.
15For instance if E[] = 0 and wa = wc, setting wc  ws guarantees full separation.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 16
ex-ante signals, , and their probabilities, , of fooling -obtaining a `pass' signal y = p-
the rm, I dene a worker's expected utility of deceiving (D=1) and revealing the type
(D=0) as,
E[U
gjD = 1] = V
l;c
E (p()w
c;g;w
p;g;) g 2 (W;B) (1.23)
E[U
gjD = 0] = V
s(w
s;g;0) g 2 (W;B): (1.24)
To calculate the share of deceivers I rst dene the benet of deceiving the rm,

g = E[U
gjD = 1]   E[U
gjD = 0] g 2 (W;B): (1.25)
Workers with combinations of (;) such that V
l;c
E > V s will attempt to deceive the rm
(D=1) and perform the complex task. The share of these low skilled workers invited to
perform the complex task who deceive the rm is given by the joint CDF of the signals
and the fooling probabilities denoted F
g
D. F
g
D is calculated as:
F
g
D =
Z max
min
Z max
min;g()
fl(;  ;1)f(;
l;
h)dd (1.26)
In addition, I need to calculate the expected probability of obtaining a `pass' signal
y = p given deception E[jD = 1]. This is given by:
E[]
g
D=1 =
Z max
min
Z max
min;g()
fl(;
min;1)f(;
min;g;
h)dd (1.27)
Note that in equation 1.27 the lower truncation of f depends on min. Also the lower
bound of the inner integral min() depends on the outer variable. The function min()
is obtained by rst making  = 0. This function combines pairs of signals and fooling
probabilities such that a worker is indierent between performing complex or simple
tasks. If I solve in terms of the fooling probability16 the result is

min =
V s
V
l;c
E (p()wc;wp) 1: (1.28)
This equation provides the lower bound fooling probabilities that are needed for a worker
to deceive given his signal. See appendix A for extra details on these calculations.
16Provided the inverse of V exists.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 17
1.4.3 Outside options
The outside options, f UH;g;  UL;gg, of the workers are determined in equilibrium using
the zero-prot condition. Throughout the thesis I use the double screening model
presented in this chapter with either one or two groups. Since the strategy to pin down
the outside options is slightly dierent in each of the cases I start with the simplest
one; the case where only one group exists17 in the economy. Refer to appendix H for
extra details on how the algorithm is set.
One group model: There are two outside options, f UH;  ULg, in this version of the
model, one per skill. To pin them down we choose  UH such that the prot of the
representative rm is equal to 0. Then,  UL is given by the expected utility of not
acquiring human capital (right hand side of equation 1.20). Note I do not impose a
value for  UL.
The way to pin down  UL as a by-product of  UH follows an insurance motive. Given
the imperfection of the educational signals, in the unlucky event that a high skilled
worker is sent to perform the simple task, a higher salary, ws, helps the rm to reduce
the overall18 payroll. This procedure has implications for the functioning of the labour
market. Under perfect information, and assuming workers cannot opt for unemployment
benets and have no other form of wealth, the procedure would lead to low skilled
workers being paid the minimum neccesary to survive (zero in my model).
Two groups model: In the model with two groups there exist 4 outside options
f UH;g;  UL;ggg2(W;B), one per group and skill. It is obvious that, for the 2 groups model
to be of any interest, there must exist a dierence between the rms' beliefs about the
groups W and B. Under this condition the strategy to pin down the outside options
takes as a starting point a colour-blind steady state19 where rms have the same belief
about each group. At this stage I shock the economy by shifting down the belief of
group, say b,and I calibrate the outside options of the high skilled, f UH;w;  UH;bg, until
zero prot holds. The choice of changing  UH;w or  UH;b depends on the initial prot
after the shock. If the prot is positive I shift up  UH;w, if it is negative I shift  UH;b
down.
17For instance if all were W or B.
18By Jensen's inequality as the utility function is concave.
19The strategy to pin down the outside options for the colour-blind steady state is the same as that
sketched for the one group model.CHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 18
1.4.4 Market clearing
Two markets must clear in each period, a goods market and two labour markets.
Goods market: Equilibrium in the goods market means that the amount of good
supplied equals the amount demanded. In the short-run equilibrium the demand of
goods might be higher that the production (if the rms' beliefs are wrong), in that case
I assume rms hold a nite stock of the consumption good that is used to keep up their
payment promises. The equation for the goods market equilibrium is
Ct = Yt + St; (1.29)
where C is total consumption, Y is output and S is stocked consumption good by the
rm.
Labour markets: Firms' demand for high and low skilled workers shape the market.
Since workers supply their labour inelastically labour markets always clear.
N
d
H = N
s
H ; N
d
L = N
s
L (1.30)
Firms demand for workers is set when they announce hiring thresholds and wages. If
their beliefs are wrong the mass of workers with signals above and below the hiring
threshold may not be the expected one. In those cases I allow the rm to change the
hiring threshold. If the mass of workers with signals above the threshold is higher
than the expected one, then market clearing occurs by the rm tightening the hiring
threshold for the complex task, thus only accepting as many workers as were expected
(those with the highest signals). The reverse is partially true and the rm would lower
the threshold to accept more workers but only up to  min;g; where  min;g is the lowest
signal such that the IC:Hg constraint is still satised, i.e. V h;c = V s.
1.5 Conclusion
I build a model of adverse selection where rms have two screening mechanisms. In
terms of labour market development the work undertaken in this chapter goes further
than the treatment oered by Coate & Loury (1993) or Moro & Norman (2004), where
rms can only use the workers' signals to allocate them either to the complex or the
simple task. In addition, I propose a dierent way to solve for the equilibrium, where
wages are not neccessarily the marginal products. This approach suggests rms onlyCHAPTER 1. A MODEL OF DOUBLE SCREENING 19
reward workers insofar as this is needed to incentivise workers to undertake a costly
investment in human capital.Chapter 2
Applications of the model with 1
group
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides three applications of the double screening model. To keep it as
simple and informative as possible I work under the assumption that only one group
exists in the economy.
First I link income distributions obtained from simulations of the model in steady
state with the evolution of the US income distribution over the last 30 years. I then
oer an explanation for the changes in the shape of the US income distribution based
on an increase in performance related payments.
The second application shows how rms' screening behaviour is aected by the
information carried by the ex-ante signals and ex-post signals and I link it to empirical
studies on the same issue.
The third contribution is in the eld of human capital. I consider whether the
level of human capital accumulation implied by the model under perfect competition
is optimal or not. To assess that consideration we include a constrained planner who
faces the same informational asymmetry as rms. I compare the investments in human
capital generated by both the planner and rms in perfect competition. The results sug-
gest perfect competition induces either under-investment or over-investment in human
capital as well as lower welfare compared to the one achieved by the planner.
The last result opens the door to considering dierent market structures other than
perfect competition. The last contribution relates market structure to workers' wel-
fare. I compare two opposite market structures, perfect competition and a zero-prot
monopsonist. The welfare induced by the zero-prot monopsonist is always higher than
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the one attained under perfect competition. This situation is softened as I allow the
monopsonist to obtain positive levels of prots. I nd that how much prot the monop-
sonist makes, denes the situations under which a monopsony is preferred. For mild
prot levels I nd that a monopsony induces higher welfare in economies where the
correlation between ex-ante signals and the skill of workers are either relatively high or
low.
2.2 Welfare and income distributions
The objective of this section is to stress the role that performance pay may play on
the US income distribution. My strategy for understanding the eect of performance
pay is to isolate it. Since performance pay arises in the model from the existence of
ex-post signals, I build three specications of the model; one with only ex-ante signals,
another one where only ex-post signals are informative and the last one where I use
the full model presented in chapter 1 with both screening mechanisms. Apart from the
just described dierences the economic environment is identical.
Model specications: The rst specication is called Firm's Selection1 (FS). In this
specication the ex-post signals are excluded and, thus, performance pay does not exist.
This specication resembles a signalling model, partially mimicking the one developed
by Moro & Norman (2004), even though I add concave utility and allow wages to be
dierent from marginal products. The second specication, called Self-Selection2 (SS),
assumes that the ex-ante signals are not informative. The SS specication is close
in spirit to Rothschild & Stiglitz (1977), as rms choose from a menu of contracts to
enforce separation. The third specication is called Double Screening (DS); it combines
both types of signals.
The (DS) specication is explained in depth in chapter 1. For details on how the
(SS) and (FS) specications are solved I refer the reader to appendixes B and C. A
summary of the main features is oered in table 2.1.
Simulations: To better understand the importance of allowing for both, ex-ante and
ex-post signals, I show the implied income and welfare distribution of each specication.
In particular I simulate 5000 worker histories for all three specications, SS, FS and DS
1Because the rm `selects' the workers' task via the hiring threshold.
2The name arises as the screening mechasnism is enabled by workers self-selecting themselves out
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Table 2.1: Dierent model specications
Features
Ex-ante Signals Ex-post signals
M
o
d
e
l (FS) Firm-Selection X 7
(SS) Self-Selection 7 X
(DS) Double Screening X X
with the parameters shown in table 2.2 and 2.3. Parameters in table 2.2 are common
while the ones in table 2.3 belong to each of the specications.
Table 2.2: Common parameters.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.6  0.9
 0.99  0.8
A 10  0.8
Ah 1 l 0
Al 0.2 h 1.6
 0.01
In the FS specication there are no ex-post signals and, therefore, we do not dene
the distribution that they come from. Also note that I assume the ex-ante signals not
to be informative in the SS case. This is done by assuming that the signals of both,
high and low skilled workers come from the same distribution.
Table 2.3: Model specic parameters.
Parameter FS SS DS
 - 0.5 0.5
 - 0.4 0.4
h - 1 1
l - 0 0
h 2.098 0 2.098
l 0 0 0
Income distributions: The income distributions that arise from these 3 specica-
tions are shown in gure 2.1. Technical details on how income is computed can beCHAPTER 2. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 1 GROUP 23
found in Appendix D.
Figure 2.1: Income distribution
−2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Income
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
 
DS
FS
SS
First let us compare the FS and SS specications as it is easier to understand
separately the implications of each screening method on the income distribution. On
the one hand, in the SS specication, performance pay creates an economy where some
individuals earn much more than the rest. On the other hand, the FS specication
creates a much smoother income distribution. The rationale is as follows, in the FS
specication payments to complex task workers exclusively depend on the ex-ante wage,
since this wage depends on a continuum of ex-ante signals wages are smoothed out.
Meanwhile, in the SS specication we nd more income dispersion since every complex
task worker earns the same ex-ante wage and, it is performance pay that makes the
dierence; those who obtain it are located in the right tail of the distribution while the
unlucky deceivers plus the simple task workers are found in the left tail.
The double screening specication DS combines features from both FS and SS. In
the income distribution that arises from the DS specication, we see, rst, a smoother
distribution than in the SS specication, and, second, the creation of a hump on the left
tail of the distribution. We can say that a more accurate ex-post signal (i.e. monitoring
device) tends to increase income dispersion. This is not surprising since the more
information is revealed about the workers' skill level, the more accurately the contracts
oered would reect the true value of a worker.
Welfare distributions: The eects of double screening can also be seen in terms
of welfare. High skilled workers would be better o if there were perfect information
in the economy. This is shown in gure 2.2 where I show the welfare distribution of
two economies, with and without perfect information, sorted by the workers' cost ofCHAPTER 2. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 1 GROUP 24
investment. I see that under perfect information high skilled workers benet while low
skilled lose out, increasing welfare dispersion.
Figure 2.2: Assymmetric vs perfect information: Utility distribution
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A more general comparison of welfare among the models is shown in gure 1.4,
with the welfare distributions from all three specications sorted in descending order of
utility. It is remarkable that the welfare distribution from the DS specication is not
skewed like the income one. The reason can be found in the contracts' shape. Since
workers are budget constrained, performance pay puts more weight on the right tail of
the income distribution than on the welfare distribution one.
Figure 2.3: Welfare distribution.
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Empirical validity: Sala I Mart n (2006) shows the US income distribution for the
last 30 years. The evolution is characterised by the appearance of a hump in the left tail
of the distribution as shown in Figure 2.3. The hump, in the model, is the result of an
increase in the informativeness of the ex-post signals. I argue that in the US an increase
in performance-related pay might have occured, perhaps because of an improvement in
the quality of the ex-post signals (better monitoring technologies, easier implementation
due to the nature of jobs) or due to rms now using this reward system.
This story is, rst of all, consistent with B enabou & Tirole's (2013) research, where
it is argued that performance-related payments have increased since the 19700s. It also
goes along the same lines as Altonji & Pierret's (2001) theory of employers' learning
which suggests the existence of double screening.
2.3 Firms' screening usage
One of the main features of the DS model is the rm's ability to choose between two
screening mechanisms. The double screening system makes use of the hiring thresholds
and the contracts. The thresholds screen the workers thanks to the stochastic dom-
inance of the signals obtained by the high skilled workers and through the posterior
probability of investing. Since the posterior p() increases monotonically in  it harms
the low skilled more than the high skilled therefore allowing the rm to set a relatively
a lower hiring threshold than it would otherwise3.
On the other hand the rationale on how to use the performance pay is simple, the
rm will set a relatively high performance pay with a simple task wage that is also high
so as to disincentivise deception by low skilled workers.
Figure 2.4 shows the reaction function of the workers to a range of rms' initial
beliefs for two of the specications discussed, double screening DS and Firms' Selection
FS. The steady state is found where the reaction function meets the 45 degree line. We
observe that double screening is associated with higher investment rates both, in the
steady state and out of the steady state (short run equilibrium). This is because the
economy rewards more accurately the skill when there are two screening mechanisms
and the incentive to invest to grows.
To show the rm's screening choice I simulate an economy for a vector of signals'
quality. Signals quality is dened as Sq = 1   OV C, where OVC is the overlapping
coecient between the distributions Fh and Fl. When Sq is 0 rms cannot gain any
valuable information when they meet the workers. When it is 1 the correlation between
3For instance if the ex-ante wage were at wa() = wc.CHAPTER 2. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 1 GROUP 26
Figure 2.4: Fixed points
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the investment decision and the signal is perfect. With regards to the parameters of
the signal distribution an OVC equal to 1 is associated with h = 0 and an OVC of 0
corresponds to h = 1.
Figure 2.5 shows shares of workers sent to perform simple tasks for each screening
method. To build the graph I x the probabilities of obtaining a `pass' signal using the
ones shown in table 2.3. As expected, the more informational the ex-ante signals are,
the more the rm relies on using hiring thresholds rather than on provoking low skilled
workers to reveal their type trough contracts (self-selection). At some point, when
the ex-ante signals' quality is relatively high, the rm no longer cares about potential
foolers as their number is low and the cost of disincentivize them is higher than the
marginal prot obtained by ensuring a better pool of workers doing complex tasks.
In Figure 2.6 I also show the wages oered by the rm because they oer valuable
information on how rms set the contracts. Because the quality of the signals alters the
pattern of human capital accumulation4 the interpretation of this gure is more subtle.
On the left hand side of the gure I expect the rm to set contracts that put o de-
ceivers. Such contracts imply a relatively high simple task wage and rising performance
pay. I do not see the latter though, because the number of investors is also increasing
and so the rm's need for a good pool of complex task workers is alleviated.
At some point in the middle of the graph the rm switches o screening through
self-selection and we see ws decreasing for two reasons: First the rm does not care
4This is further expanded in section 2.4.CHAPTER 2. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 1 GROUP 27
Figure 2.5: Firm's usage of double screening.
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about deceivers self-selecting themselves to do simple tasks. For the second reason
remember that rms pay a non-zero simple task wage as insurance for investors who
could be wrongly placed in the simple task. As the information carried by the ex-ante
signals improve the insurance motive vanishes and so the need for a higher ws.
Finally the complex task base payment, wc, (the maximum a worker could earn
provided p(;e g) = 1) decreases sharply. This occurs because as the informational
quality of the signals improves the rm does not need to pay such a high wc to satisfy
the IC.H constraint because p() is doing a better job of identifying high skilled workers.
An implication of this result is that economies -or sectors within an economy- with bad
quality ex-ante signals should show smoother income distributions as it is dicult to
reward ability and the ex-ante payment is going to be almost equally distributed among
all the workers assigned to the complex task.
2.4 Human capital accumulation
I develop a benevolent planner5 to test whether the market outcome under perfect
competition is ecient or not. The planner's objective function is the social welfare
function and the planner has the power to set wages and hiring thresholds. Welfare
is dened, in this and the other chapters of the thesis, as aggregate welfare, assuming
every individual in society has the same weight (utilitarian criterion).
Notice the planner knows his decisions aect the investment rate in human capital.
5Details of the problem can be found in appendix E.CHAPTER 2. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 1 GROUP 28
Figure 2.6: Firm's usage of double screening.
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This planner shall be regarded as a second best though, as he cannot observe the
workers' investment choices and therefore is constrained. I prefer to omit the rst best
result as the informational requirements seem unreasonable and far from reality. The
constrained planner, thus, also faces the problem of asymmetric information.
The dierences in screening choice are obvious with respect to the perfect compe-
tition case. The planner keeps using self-selection irrespective of the signals' quality.
This can be seen in gure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Planner's usage of double screening.
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The main dierence between the planner and the versions of the model under perfect
competition is in the benet of investing to workers. The analysis follows Figure 2.8,
where I see the steady state investment rate, ss, under the constrained planner and
under perfect competition for a vector of ex-ante signal quality. On the one hand high
ex-ante signal quality (to the right of the gure) makes rms under perfect competition
set contracts that create a broader gap between the expected utilities of investing and
non-investing, thus, creating a bigger benet to investing than under the planner's rule.
On the other hand when the ex-ante signal quality is low (to the left of Figure 2.8) the
planner makes a more intense usage of contracts to induce self-selection than do rms
under perfect competition. This creates a higher benet to investing and therefore
investment rates rise in the case of the constrained planner.
As a conclusion I can say that perfect competition entails under-investment when
the ex-ante signal quality is low and over-investment when the ex-ante signal quality
is high. Only by chance could the level of human capital under perfect competition be
optimal.
Figure 2.8: Investment rate. Perfect competition vs. constrained planner.
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The role of market structure: The lack of eciency found in the level of human
capital under perfect competition opens the door to considering the possibility that
dierent market structures are better in terms of welfare. In this regard I analyse the
market structure that most closely ts the constrained planner; a monopsony.
A monopsony is made of a sole employer with market power to set wages and hiringCHAPTER 2. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 1 GROUP 30
Figure 2.9: Welfare, perfect competition vs. monopsony.
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thresholds without any threats from any other rm. More importantly it also inter-
nalises the eect of wages on the incentives to invest (just like the planner discussed).
The existence of two dierences between the constrained planner and the monopsonist
are likely, though, to inuence the analysis. First the monopsonist is a prot, not a
welfare, maximiser. Second, positive levels of prot monopsonies are known to exist in
monopsonies that are not given to workers6.
To make the analysis I build a zero prot monopsonist as an upper bound for
welfare7. The dierences in human capital accumulation between these two resemble
the one shown in Figure 2.8 and it is omitted. It is more interesting to show the level
of welfare achieved under the monopsony and in an economy with rms under perfect
competition. I see in Figure 2.9 that under a monopsony, the economy always achieves
higher welfare than under perfect competition. Obviously if I shift up the level of prot
that the monopsony can obtain, the set of signal quality values where a monopsony is
more ecient becomes smaller.
As a rule of thumb, and provided a monopsonist always makes some level of prot,
I could say a monopsony is preferable in terms of welfare to perfect competition in
economies where signal quality is relatively extreme (either high or low).
6Note the planner's feasibility condition is a zero prot constraint.
7Please refer to appendix G for detailed denition of welfare.CHAPTER 2. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 1 GROUP 31
Taxation: Modifying an economy's market structure might be complex and not have
such desirable consequences. Given that we know what the optimal policy for invest-
ment in human capital is, if I knew how informative the ex-ante and ex-post signals are
(i.e. the informational structure of the labour market) I could tax the rms' payroll to
obtain an outcome similar to the constrained planner.
Taxes should depend on the case. If there is under-investment in human capital the
incentive to invest should grow. Subsidies towards performance-related payments or a
lower minimum wage for the simple tasks would work in the right direction.
The contrary holds if it is over-investment in human capital that exists. Heavier
taxation against performance pay or higher minimum wages would shrink the incentive
to invest so that the level of human capital moves closer to the optimal.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I use the model of adverse selection developed in chapter 1 assuming
only one group populates the economy. I only use one group to focus on the eects of
double screening on labour market and economy-wide outcomes. I show that the skill
composition of the workers employed in the complex task improves when rms take
advantage of the two screening mechanism. I also oer insights on how the screening
usage depends on the informativeness of each signal method.
Finally I use the model for two purposes, as an explanation for the changes in the
shape of the US income distribution, and for testing whether or not perfect competition
oers an optimal accumulation of human capital. I nd for the former that double
screening might play an important role in explaining changes to the income distribution
due to an increase in performance-related payments. As for the latter I show not only
that perfect competition implies a non-optimal level of human capital, but also that
competition-restrictive market structures such a monopsony might oer better results
in terms of welfare. Finally I hint at how taxes might approximate a monopsony's
human capital level without changing the market structure.Chapter 3
Applications of the model with 2
groups
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I use the model developed in chapter one assuming the existence of two
groups, W and B. These groups of workers are perfectly distinguishable from each
other by a characteristic that is unrelated to productivity. This characteristic can be
thought of being race, ethnicity, language or dressing customs. We model two groups
because statistical discrimination might arise if rms' beliefs about the two groups dier
from each other.
The model with two groups is intended as a continuation of the papers written by
Coate & Loury (1993) and Moro & Norman (2004). I extend this part of the literature
on statistical discrimination by including performance pay, concave utility and wages
that might dier from the marginal products.
Statistical discrimination is, alongside taste for discrimination1, one of the prevail-
ing explanations for treating individuals with similar skill sets dierently2. In practice,
statistical discrimination arises whenever an easy to observe worker's characteristic (i.e.
race) is correlated with a hard to observe variable such as worker's ability. An employer
in this situation is tempted to use race as a cheap source of information and thus dis-
criminate on an individual basis, even though the group itself is not being discriminated
against.
1See Becker (1953) and Arrow (1973) for an economic analysis on the consequences of employers'
distaste for one of the groups in the economy.
2As arises from the surveys of Aigner & Cain (1977) or Fang & Moro (2010)
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Statistical discrimination is not the only theory used to explain the existence of
earnings dierentials between races. Becker's (1953) theory on taste for discrimination
argues that employers pay less to blacks than to whites because it makes them happier.
I believe though, that explaining discrimination as coming from a prot maximising
behaviour is more appealing and sound.
The literature on statistical discrimination started with Arrow (1973) and Phelps
(1974). Firms in their setting use a worker's race during the hiring process insofar as
it is correlated with his true productivity. Arrow's paper, in particular lays out the
foundations for the literature in statistical discrimination and it seems like the source
from where later papers took o. Apart from explaining the basic idea behind statistical
discrimination he suggests endogenising the human capital decision and the idea that
negative beliefs might be self-fullling. Those ideas have been used by several papers
including include Borjas & Goldberg (1978), Coate & Loury (1993), Moro & Norman
(2004) and Kim & Coate (2009) among others. In particular our research follows the
line set by Coate & Loury and Moro & Norman. The former paper oers a model of
signaling with human capital accumulation with exogenous wages. Moro & Norman
improved Coate & Loury's model by allowing for general equilibrium eects and thus
endogenising wages. Both papers oer two extreme equilibria, one where all groups'
beliefs converge to the same value and another one in which the disfavoured group's
investment rate goes to 0.
Performance pay: One concern with respect to these two models is that they are one
shot games where employers set wages once depending on the workers' signals. These
games' discriminatory equilibria would unravel were the employers able to observe, ex-
post, the actual ability of workers and condition all wages on that observation. Firms
can pay the whole wage ex-post because in these models consumers' utility is linear.
I do not think linear utility is a reasonable description of reality and thus I assume
concave utility.
Kim & Loury (2009) oer, in fact, a dynamic version of Coate & Loury (1993)
although discriminatory equilibria could still be unravelled by performance pay. I think
our dynamic model adds value with respect to their paper as I allow for pre-market
dierences between races and we allow rms to fully condition contracts on race among
other distinctive features.
The aforementioned lack of performance pay does not t well with current research
on rm behaviour. According to empirical studies by Altonji & Pierret (2001) or Lang
& Siniver (2011) I see that even though starting salaries do depend on easily availableCHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 34
information (years of schooling, name of the school attended), experienced workers'
earnings tend to depend on actual ability. This suggests that rms are capable of
learning a worker' ability over time and using it. One of the results in this chapter is
that the screening usage (the intensity with which the rm uses each screening method)
varies with the group. In addition, I show that allowing rms to choose dierent
contracts for dierent groups proves to be more eective in closing the racial wage gap
than the use of the same contracts for both groups.
Policy advice: More importantly the model suggests that the use by the rms of
statistical discrimination is indeed benecial for the discriminated group in terms of
earnings. This is because performance pay acts as a remedial compensation for those
who actually possess high ability and encourages human capital accumulation in the
disfavoured group. The extent to which statistical discrimination is actually benecial
for the disfavoured group depends on the rms' ability to condition payments on the
workers' performance. I know though, that rms might have a hard time nding out a
worker's actual productivity and therefore I allow for an imperfect detection of workers'
performance in the model.
Another measure for the success of a group in the economy is given by the prevalence
of its members in high skilled jobs. We follow Coate & Loury (1993) and Moro &
Norman (2004) by assuming the existence of rms' initial beliefs with regards to the
average productivity of each of the groups in the economy. These beliefs are crucial
-they inuence the mass of workers of each group hired for a high skilled position- but
the current literature has only focused on their long-run value. This chapter oers, in
addition, beliefs' evolutionary paths and a new, more exible type of steady state.
The last section of this chapter is based on explaning the evolution of the US racial
wage gap. To do so we allow for pre-market dierences between races. This delves
into Phelps (1974) as, to the best of my knowledge, he was the rst to put together
statistical discrimination and ex-ante dierent groups. His analysis was, though, criti-
cised by Dennis Aigner & Glen Cain (1977), who seemed `disconcerted' about Phelps'
assumption of pre-market dierences. They argued discrimination should be assessed
as dierences in earnings given the initial conditions are the same. But discrimination
might also exist even if the initial setup is favourable to one of the groups, by making
the result even more favourable for the members of that group. I, therefore, allow for
pre-market dierences as well as in beliefs.
The results of the two groups' model have consequences for how to prove the em-
pirical existence of statistical discrimination itself. This model shows that two oppositeCHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 35
eects, self-selection and statistical discrimination might co-exist in a labour market
with asymmetric information. If this is the case and rms hold a negative belief for
one of the groups, members of the disadvantaged group will self-select more often than
members of the favoured group3. A higher degree of self-selection implies that the sig-
nals of those from the disfavoured group doing complex tasks are higher than those
of the members coming from the favoured group. Thus, if statistical discrimination
and self-selection co-exist no dierence in wages might be observed between blacks and
whites even though blacks should be earning more.
More importantly explaining wage dierentials by conditioning either on schooling
or occupation may fail to get rid of the self-selection bias. Indeed, a regression of
such kind might potentially yield no dierence in wages between races while masking
potential usage of race by employers. This argument can be applied in Altonji & Pierret
(2001). They suggest statistical discrimination, if at all, has low prevalence because the
race coecient in their Mincer equation does not show correlation with ex-ante wages.
Their result is in contrast, though, to the research by Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004),
where it is argued that employers might actively use race when hiring.
3.2 Discriminatory beliefs
This section can be thought of as a continuation of a literature on statistical discrim-
ination, in particular the models developed by Coate & Loury (1993) and Moro &
Norman (2004). An important concern shared with those models is whether an initial
negative belief towards one of the groups might be self-fulllling or not. This is, indeed,
a recurrent theme in the literature as stems from the review by Moro & Fang (2010).
Throughout this section I consider the economy is in an initial scenario where,
maybe due to some historical reasons, rms hold a discriminatory belief towards the B
group.
Denition A discriminatory belief is formed by a pair of rm's beliefs fe w;e bg such
that e w > e b.
I choose this particular setting because it seems to capture well the situations of, for
instance, blacks and women. We can, thus, wonder whether an economy where one
group is initially disadvantaged (in the sense of facing a discriminatory belief) is able
3This occurs for two reasons, rst members of the favoured group invest more so fewer can self-
select themselves out of complex tasks. Second given the optimal screening, rms tend to induce more
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to reach a race-neutral steady state without help. Firms' beliefs converge and a race-
neutral steady is achieved whenever beliefs are equal to each other. A convergent steady
state is dened as follows:
Denition A convergent steady state is formed by rms' beliefs fe w
ss;e w
ssg such that
e w
ss = e b
ss.
Likewise, rms' beliefs diverge and the economy never enters into a race-neutral steady
state whenever rms' belief about the disadvantaged group is 0. A divergent steady
state is dened as:
Denition A divergent steady state is formed by rms' beliefs fe w
ss;e w
ssg such that
e w
ss 2 [0;1] and e b
ss = 0.
Belief divergence implies no B group workers is hired to perform the complex task. I
consider that this equilibrium, even though used by other papers, is too extreme to be
seen in reality and, therefore, not as informative as I would want. I x this issue in the
next section where I add a third steady state type to allow for non-zero rms' beliefs
but dierent from each other.
The reader should keep in mind that simulations in this section assume that B
and W workers obtain, on average, the same advantages and face the same costs from
investing in human capital,
A
w
h = A
b
h F
w
h = F
b
h and F
w
 = F
b
: (3.1)
Simulations are provided under two economic environments, one where rms have to
pay the same wages fwc;wp;wsg to both groups (as it is assumed in the literature) and
another where I allow complete contract freedom. For comparability with past papers
in the area we are interested in equilibrium where no ex-ante dierences exist between
the groups.
3.2.1 Without contract freedom
The purpose of this numerical experiment is to compare the eect of performance pay in
a setup as close as possible to past papers in the area. Simulations in this subsection are
performed assuming rms' ability to choose dierent wages for each group is removed.
This means
w
c;w = w
c;b ; w
s;w = w
s;b and w
p;w = w
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Still rms are able to use group membership in the Bayesian posterior and to use
dierent hiring thresholds as I assume they cannot be stopped from doing that (i.e.
such behaviour would be legally dicult to prove).
The experiment consists on simulating two economies, one where rms have access
to both screening methods (the model I propose in this thesis) and another one where
rms can only use ex-ante signals to screen the workers (as it is done in past papers).
Then, the experiment is done in two steps; rst, for each economy, I obtain the colour-
blind steady state (right hand side of each graph at Figure 3.1). Then I shock the
economy with an array of rms' belief about the B group such that they are below the
one for the W group under the colour-blind steady state, e b 2 (0;e w
ss).
Figure 3.1: Convergence. Double screening vs. Firm's Selection (Signaling)
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The graph on the left of Figure 3.1 shows an economy where rms can use both
screening methods while the one on the right shows an economy where only ex-ante
signals can be used as a method of screening. The way to interpret the graph is the
following, points above the 45 degree line are convergent (i.e. if I let the rm update
its beliefs we arrive at a convergent steady state). Points below the 45 degree line
are divergent. A divergent equilibrium is more likely the more the rm rely on group
W workers, thus reducing the benet to invest of group B. We can observe that the
addition of performance pay signicantly reduces the set of initial beliefs for the B
group that lead to a divergent equilibrium.
In sum Figure 3.1 shows performance pay helps to reduce the set of initial beliefs
where a divergent equilibrium -in the sense described in this section- occurs. Even
though I cannot state the necessary conditions for convergence to be the prevailing
situation independently of the initial belief, I can say the existence of a convergent
equilibrium is positively associated with the quality of the detection technology. That
is, in an economy where performance pay exists, the possibility of being in a divergent
equilibrium is less likely to occur.CHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 38
3.2.2 With contract freedom
The objective of the second numerical experiment is to show the eect of contract
freedom on convergence in beliefs. Contract freedom is translated into the model as a
permission to rms to pay dierent wages on the basis of group membership and it is,
arguably, a policy controversial enough to be of interest.
The experiment consists of simulating economies with contract freedom to compare
with my results from subsection 3.2. The rst step to run the numerical simulation
assumes a colour-blind steady state where rms' beliefs are such that e w = e b. Then
we ask what would happen if the belief with respect to the B-group investment rate
deteriorates, e b 2 (0;e w
ss).
Figure 3.2: Investment reaction functions.
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Figure 3.2 shows reaction functions of the B and W groups' investment rates for
a range of rms' beliefs about group B. I x the rms' belief about group W group
at the colour-blind steady state level, ss. As in Figure 3.1 reactions above the 45
degree line are associated with a convergent steady state, below it are associated with
a divergent steady state. Note that a reaction above the 45 degree line means that, if
I keep iterating the model, the economy will enter the colour-blind steady state. The
contrary is also true and a reaction below the 45 degree line implies that the belief
about the discriminated against group is 0 in steady state.
The graph in Figure 3.2 implies that no matter how low is the belief for the B group
there exists convergence between the beliefs of the two groups. This result does not
depend on the existence of performance pay though, rather, it depends on allowing theCHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 39
rm to choose dierent contracts for dierent groups. As a result rms' hiring policies
under contract freedom tend to promote the B group investment in human capital.
Next I turn to the screening behaviour of the rm when the belief towards group
B becomes discriminatory. The subsequent discussion is based on a basic idea; when
rms' belief about the B group deteriorates they prefer to change the payments instead
of the hiring threshold. This behaviour that might seem inocuous at rst is the main
driver for the result shown in Figure 3.2, that the Divergent steady state does not exist
under contract freedom.
Payments are changed for the B group such that the wages B workers would receive
in the complex task go up while the one in the simple task goes down, relative to the
W group levels. This modication in the contract increases the incentive to invest for
the B group members, which explains the reaction function shown in gure 3.2.
Figure 3.3: Screening policy with dierent initial belief.
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 helps us to understand the change in rms' hiring behaviour.
Figure 3.3 has two graphs contianing the rms' screening behaviour for the W group
(left)and the B group (right). On the right side of each graph I show the proportion of
low skilled workers that are correctly sent to perform simple tasks, I call this sceening
mechanism Firm's Selection. On the left side of the graphs I show the proportion of
low skilled that is invited to perform complex tasks but choose to opt out and perform
the simple task; this mechanism is called Self-Selection. A range of beliefs for the B
group is represented on the x-axis. Note I do not use beliefs, e b, close to 0 because the
little knowledge it adds does not compensate the computational demands it requires.
As a result I observe that the screening intensity is maintained for both groups with
one exception. The rm relaxes the amount of W workers that are Self-Selected. This
is due to a technological issue. Since the rm thinks there are less workers who invest
in the economy (from group B) the employer decides to re-address the issue by allowingCHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 40
more workers from the W group to join the complex task.
Then in gure 3.4 I show the dierences between group B and group W's wages. We
can see the reaction of the rm is to make deceiving less appealing for group B (the one
perceived to have invested less) by raising the complex task ex-ante base payment, wc,
and performance pay wp. Notice the fact that the rm, given total freedom to use the
wage mechanism, chooses wages that maintain almost constant the screening intensity
for both groups. This is remarkable because in versions of the model where rms are
forced to set wb = ww we observe a dierent screening behaviour for each group. In
particular we observe that the rm relies more on self-selection for group B and on
Firm-Selection for the W group.
Figure 3.4: Firms' wage policy with varying beliefs.
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Two lessons are worth remembering from this section. The rst one is that when the
rm is allowed to set dierent wages for each group, the divergent equilibrium does not
exist. The model will never have a B group that does not invest in human capital at all.
The second lesson is that, even when the rm is not allowed to set dierent wages, the
addition of performance pay shrinks the set of group B beliefs that lead to a divergent
equilibrium. This can be generalised to shocks similar in eect to an improvement in
the detection technology. These include positive developments in nancial markets that
allow workers to better endure performance payments.CHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 41
3.3 The case of the US
In subsection 3.2.2, where we assume that both groups are ex-ante equal and that
contract freedom exists, convergence between the two groups does not take longer than
2 to 3 generations to occur. This subsection starts by wondering why we do not see this
in countries like the US, where the racial wage gap has been persistent since the 19th
century and, for many years, rms were free to pay dierent wages to dierent races.
My focus to explain the persistence of the US racial wage gap is on the role of
pre-market factors. Since these are factors dier between races in the model, I can ask
not only how policies aect employment outcomes conditional on pre-market factors
but also how pre-market factors respond to policies.
Indeed, past models of statistical discrimination, like Moro & Norman (2004) and
Blume (2006), can be criticised for lacking an explanation of the observed racial wage
gap persistence. This criticism, though, could be judged as unreasonable. These models
assume both groups are ex-ante identical and just cover the labour market interactions.
Research papers like Heckman (1998) or Neal & Johnson (1996) suggest that dierent
groups do not enjoy the same opportunities before they start working. Their conclu-
sions imply the aforementioned models are just incapable of providing a satisfactory
explanation of the race gap's persistence.
In fact, Neil & Johnson argue that most of the wage dierential between races
could be explained by a measure of actual ability. Heckman (1998) also delves into the
same argument when explaining that the use of certain variables in Mincer Equations
is misleading when assessing dierences in earnings. An example of Heckman's line of
thought relates to the use high school graduation to assess dierences in return between
blacks and whites. The problem in this case arises because the census data uses as GED
(General Equivalence Degree) and graduation from high school as equivalents while the
signal sent by each holder is arguably dierent. Since more blacks than whites hold
GED certicates, a standard regression using the generic variable `High school graduate'
would wrongly point to black high school graduates being discriminated against. On
a more general level Heckman argues that if we could control for what the rm sees
(not just what the dataset tells us) the explained portion of the wage would rise from
20%-30% to 60%-80%. To sum up, it can be argued that assuming the residuals from
a Mincer Equation can represent discrimination that seems to be far from correct.
My model of double screening allows me to take this argument even further though,
by arguing that not only could such variables as years of schooling or occupation be
misleading when assesing the existence of discrimination, but variables such as theCHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 42
AFQT4 could too. This is because the share of black workers performing simple tasks
might contain a higher proportion of self-selected individuals in the sense described in
this thesis. Thus, nding that both races earn the same (even after controlling for some
variables) is not conclusive in terms of rejecting the existence of discrimination.
In light of the results from Neal & Johnson and Heckman it could be argued that pre-
market dierences might be an important cause of labour market dierences between
races. They can be classied into two broad groups, schooling opportunities and family
background. What I do in this section is extend the analysis of section 3.2 by allowing
for pre-market dierences between the two groups. We focus on the inter-temporal
evolution of the workers pre-market investments in education as an explanation for the
race gap persistence.
The last part of this chapter is focused on convergence in earnings between blacks
and whites. I compare the speed of convergence under two policy regimes, a colour-
neutral hiring policy that forbids the usage of race and one that allows rms to use race
when hiring. The ban for using race when hiring is associated with the one implied
by the title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. My results suggest that allowing rms
to discriminate racially in setting wages and in allocating jobs speeds up convergence,
and that this result is stronger the more rms rely on performance pay. The result
occurs because the incentives to invest for the disfavoured group are stronger under the
unconstrained regime than under the one banning the use of race.
3.3.1 The racial gap in the US
It was not before the 1950's that the racial wage gap signicantly started to decrease.
This is shown in gure 3.5 where I provide black and white income ratios of each birth
cohort. We see that the (1931-1936) cohort was the rst generation who saw a decrease
in the income racial gap as pointed out in Smith (1984). Smith's idea of showing
the data by cohort serves to illustrate that something happened after the 1940's that
helped blacks' income convergence. In particular he supports the idea that convergence
in schooling opportunities due to historical reasons were a main driving force.
Indeed, Section 3.2's prediction of a fast catch up of black's income with whites'
coupled with the actual persistence of the racial income gap seem to point to the ex-
istence of certain pre-market dierences between groups. These pre-market dierences
would be the ones preventing full convergence from happening. The importance of these
dierences in causing the racial wage gap can be found in the work of Heckman (1998)
4Armed Forces Qualication test.CHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 43
Figure 3.5: Black/White income gap by birth cohort
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and Neil & Johnson(1996). Their papers mention dierences in family background as
well as in schooling opportunities5 as being able to explain a large part of the wage
dierential.
According to Heckman (1998) schooling opportunities and family support explain
how a worker is perceived by his employer and his actual level of skill which, in turn,
is one of the main determinants of a worker's wage.
I adapt the model to allow for pre-market factors. In doing so I translate the dierent
distributions of family backgrounds as the cost of investment. I assume workers with
worse family background will have a harder time to remain enrolled, nd time to study
and pay the tuition fees. In addition dierences in schooling are tranlated into the
model via the signals and the complex task productivity. On the one hand we assume
a worker's signal depend partially on the school's name or the networks built while in
school as pointed in Borjas (1999). On the other hand, I assume some schools and
universities prepare workers better for the labour market than other. In the remainder
of the section I work on the assumption that dierences between blacks and whites
might exist in pre-market factors.
5See Espenshade & Radford (2009) for a review of how families aect university admisions of their
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3.3.2 The eect of schooling dierences
Educational opportunities for blacks improved slowly during the decades before 1940
as pointed out in Bowen & Bok (1998). It was not before the 1940's that the school
attendance rates rose as a result of migrational movements of southern blacks to the
industrialised north, as is pointed out in Lang (2007) and Bowen & Bok (1998). The
movement was due to the higher labour demand that was prevailing at the beginning
of the 2nd World War.
The generation that was born during these years enjoyed an improvement of their
schooling conditions. Schooling opportunities were better in the north for blacks.
Lighter racial bigotry coupled with a higher proportion of blacks now living in cities
helped enrolment rates. By 1960 the length of the school term and teachers salaries
had almost converged between black and white schools. In addition median years of
schooling for blacks aged 25-29 rose from 7 years at the beginning of the 1940's to
10.5 at the begining of the 1960's. Bowen & Bok show data on graduation rates. The
proportion of blacks that graduated from high school rose from 12% to 38% while the
proportion who graduated from college shifted from 1.6% to 5.4%. It was a result of
this new migrational pattern that southern states started to improve the 1950's blacks'
schooling conditions in an attempt to stop the ow of workers to the north.
The above facts describe two eects, higher labour demand and better schooling
opportunities. Even though arguably the former could have helped blacks' earnings
potential it was the improvements in schooling quality and ex-ante signals that started
the virtuous circle as argued in Smith (1988)
A Divergence exercise
In this subsection I run a numerical experiment to see whether or not a reduction in
education quality produces an earnings gap. The rst step is to simulate a colour-blind
steady state where rms hold the same belief about both groups, fe w
ss = e b
ssg. Then
I lower the average ex-ante signal of black high skilled workers and let rms update
their beliefs until a new steady state is achieved. The objective is to show that the
model can move from a colour blind steady state to a steady state where one group is
disadvantaged by creating pre-market dierences.
In contrast to the economy shown in section 3.2, the model might be in an steady
state where rms' belief about blacks is neither zero nor the same as that about whites.
I refer to this steady state as `interior'.
Denition An interior equilibrium is characterize by rms' beliefs fe w
ss;e b
ssg such thatCHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 45
e ssw 2 [0;1] and 0 < e b
ss < e w
ss.
A clarication is due with regards to the relationship among the interior steady state
and the other two steady states dened so far. The interior steady state belongs to the
same `family' as the convergent steady state -dened in Section 3.2- in the sense that
if I were to remove the dierences in pre-market factors beliefs, the model new steady
state would show e w
ss = e b
ss and a convergent steady state would have been obtained.
The existence of the interior steady state allows us to perform quantitavely accurate
assessments of a diversity of policies. Now I am not only measuring whether earnings
converge or not, but also by how much and how fast.
Figure 3.6 shows rms' beliefs over time, for blacks and whites. The x-axis represents
time (each unit of time is thought to represent 25 years) and the y-axis rms' beliefs. In
the graph the beliefs diverge from each other until they enter the new -interior- steady
state. This implies that in the presence of pre-market dierences between groups, the
steady state black/white income ratio can be shifted below 1.
Figure 3.6: Beliefs converging to a non-colour-blind steady state.
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Black workers also suer in terms of welfare. This can be seen in gure 3.7. In this
gure the y-axis represents aggregate welfare6. The reason why at the beginning blacks
are better o is because the rm is being fooled. The employer thinks blacks are more
productive than they actually are, therefore paying and hiring more than it would have
chosen.
6See appendix G for the calculations.CHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 46
Figure 3.7: Black and white's welfare.
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Finally table 3.1 shows the behaviour of the rm in the new interior steady state.
The representative rm chooses dierent screening mechanisms for each race. It uses
the hiring threshold to drive out white low skilled workers (F-S, rm selection) and
relies on self-selection (S-S) to get rid of the blacks deceivers.
Table 3.1: Steady state. Discriminatory steady-state.
Variables F-S S-S wc wp ws
Solutions W 0.5180 0.1585 5.4384 2.6873 2.8936
Solutions B 0.1025 0.7694 8.8930 3.0624 3.7174
As a summary, I have shown, by means of a simulation, that pre-market dierences
may play an important role in stopping the convergence of earnings between whites and
blacks.
3.3.3 The eect of banning race from hiring
Now we move forward to 1964, the year when the rst CRA powerful enough to deter
discriminatory behaviour was enacted. In particular I focus on the eects that its title
VII brought to the labour market. Title VII declares it unlawful `to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or, the usage of theCHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 47
worker's race when hiring or deciding the compensation'.
This content is translated into the model's language as a ban for dierent hiring
thresholds, use of race in the Bayesian posterior and use of dierent base payments for
blacks and whites. Because checking rms' hiring thresholds might be hard, I follow
Coate & Loury (1993) by allowing rms to use dierent ones even after the ban. With
regards to the Bayesian posterior, the rm uses the average belief when computing it,
p(;e 
Ave) =
e Avefh()
e Avefh() + (1   e Ave)fl()
(3.3)
where the average belief is equal to e Ave = 0:5we w + 0:5be b. Finally, I assume the
ban imposes wc;w = wc;b, wp;w = wp;b and ws;w = ws;b.
Did the ban help to close the black/white income gap? To answer that question I go
back to the 1940's and simulate two economies. These economies start o from the same
discriminatory steady state where blacks are believed to be less productive that blacks
doing the complex task fAb
h = 0:7;Aw
h = 1g, to obtain worse signals fb
h = 1;w
h =
2:098g and to endure higher investment costs fb
 = 1:8;w
 = 1:2g. Then I shock both
economies by shutting the gap in signals, fb
h = w
h = 2:098g, and the complex task
productivity, fAb
h = Aw
h = 1g. This is like assuming that all enjoy the same schooling
opportunities. In addition, I decrease the gap in investment costs proportionally to
the increase in the share of high skilled workers of the last generation. The idea is
to associate smarter parents with lower costs of investments to the point that if both
groups invest in human capital at the same rate, the investment costs are the same.
Table 3.2 shows parameters regarding the preferences and the technology used for the
calibration of the initial steady state. The income share of the complex task, , is
calibrated following data from US on high-skilled/low-skilled earnings;  is set so that
there is yearly discounting of 4%.
Table 3.2: Preferences and technology
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.6  0.66
 0.99  0.01
A 10 Ab
h 0.7
Aw
h 1 Al 0.2
In table 3.3 I show the parameters used for detection technology, signals and invest-
ment costs for each race in the initial steady state. The detection technology is assumedCHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 48
to be mild (the average fooling probability is 0.5) as well as the signals distributions.
The investment costs' lower bound is set to 0 to match the domain of the incentives to
invest <+, as allowing for negative investment costs would artically create investors.
In addition I assume the proportion of blacks in the economy is b = 20%.
Table 3.3: Detection tech., ex-ante signals dist. and investment costs.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.5  2
 0.4 h 2.6
h 1 l 0
l 0 w
h 2.098
w
 1.2 b
h 1
b
 1.8 h = l 2
One of the economies is called the unconstrained model, as the rm can use statis-
tical discrimination freely. The other economy is the constrained model that mimics
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act with respect to the use of race in the hiring pro-
cess. The constraint means rms have to use an average belief in the formation of the
Bayesian posterior and have to pay the base payments to both groups. Still we assume
rms in the constrained model can set dierent hiring thresholds as their existence is
hard to prove.
Results are shown in gure 3.8, where time units represent 25 years (a generation).
The graph shows faster convergence in earnings when rms statistically discriminate
than when they cannot. The simulated steady state implies a high degree of segregation
in the job market. Approximately 2% of the workers doing complex tasks are black. It
should be noted blacks represent 20% of the total population in this economy.
3.4 Conclusion
The rst part of this chapter can be thought of as the continuation of a literature on
statistical discrimination, in particular the models developed by Coate & Loury and
Moro & Norman (2004).
The model we propose diers from the papers just mentioned because we allow
for performance pay, assume concave utility and use a dierent market structure and
equilibrium concept; but more importantly we allow the rm to pay dierent wages
wc;wp;ws for each group.CHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 49
Figure 3.8: Black/White simulated income ratio
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Two lessons are worth remember. The rst one is that when allow the rm to set
dierent wages for each group the divergent equilibrium does not exist. We will not
have a B group without investing in human capital at all. The second lesson is that,
had not we allowed the rm to set dierent wages, the addition of performance pay
shrinks the set of B group beliefs that lead to a divergent equilibrium. This can be
generalized to shocks similar in eect to an improvement in the detection technology.
These include positive developments in nancial markets that allow workers to better
endure performance payments.
The last part of the chapter is a policy orientated one. I start by showing the
persistence of the dierences in black/white income ratio. I follow James Heckman
and James Smith when arguing these dierences in income might be due to pre-market
dierences between the races.
I allow the model to have pre-market diereces in schooling and family background.
The objective is to show my model is able to mimic a situation like the one occurring
in the 1940's in the US. The exercise I carry out with the latter aim is even stronger
than I would need to suggest pre-market dierences can sustain an income gap. I start
an economy which is in a colour-blind steady state to nd out that a racial wage gap
is created once we allow for dierences in signals for the investors in human capital.
Lastly I carry out an exercise to test whether it is preferable to ban the usage
of race from the labour market or, rather it is better to defend race-neutral policies.
In order to make this computational exercise we calibrate an economy to mimic the
black/white income ratio prevailing in the 1960's and I let rms update their beliefsCHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL WITH 2 GROUPS 50
for several periods. The result is that the economy where race can be used shows a
faster convergence rate of blacks' earnings than the economy where the usage of race is
banned.Conclusion
This thesis studies the role of asymmetric information in the labour from a variety of
perspectives. In chapter one we lay down the foundations of the research by building a
model of adverse selection with endogenous human capital, double screening and two
groups potentially populating the economy.
In the second chapter I show applications of the model with one group. I start
with a discussion on the optimal screening policy of the rm and how the addition
of a detection technology makes the theory to t better with the employers' learning
theory. Second I show the increase in performance pay as a plausible explanation for
the rise in the US income inequality. At last I focus on human capital accumulation. I
remark that perfect competition does not lead to ecient human capital accumulation.
In fact, market structures with fewer rms and therefore less competition might oer
more ecient outcomes.
The third chapter contributes to the literature on statistical discrimination by
adding a second group to the model. Statistical discrimination arises naturally in this
setting with asymmetric information and identiable groups. This chapter's contribu-
tion is twofold:
First I focus on earnings convergence between groups. To this respect, the addition
of ex-post signals on top of ex-ante signals oer rms the capacity to choose dierent
screening methods for each group in the economy. The increase in choice facilitates
convergence in earnings between the two groups because the benet to invest in human
capital grows when wage inequality increases.
Finally, and based on the model's results, I argue that the persistence of the racial
wage gap in the US cannot be explained without pre-market dierences in ability. In
addition I argue that allowing rms to statistically discriminate might speed up the
earnings convergence between groups. The latter has a stronger eect the easier it is
for rms to detect and to condition payments on actual ability.
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Joint CDF and expected value
In chapter 1 I need to calculate the joint CDF of two disjoint truncated normal random
variables and the expected value of one of the variables. With regards to the former
the joint CDF is dened as
FD =
Z max
min
Z max
min()
fl(;  ;1)f(;
l;
h)dd, (A.1)
but a word must be said about the integration limits. The upper bounds of both
integrals are given by the upper limits of the variables' truncated normal distributions
i.e. max = 11, max = h. On the contrary the calculations for the lower bounds are
more subtle. On the one hand the lower bound of the outer integral min might depend
on the upper bound of the inner integral max in the following way:2:

min = max

V s
(V l;c(max)) 1;  

(A.2)
On the other hand the lower bound of the inner integral depends on the outer variable.
The idea is that I must ensure the pairs ; satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
for a low skilled to accept a complex task.

min =
V s
(V l;c()) 1 (A.3)
1fl is not truncated from above
2Provided the inverse of V l;c exists.
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In addition I calculate the expected probability of fooling given that a worker de-
ceives the rm E[jD = 1]. This is done as follows,
E[jD = 1] =
Z max
min
Z max
min()
fl(;
min;1)f(;
min;
h)dd, (A.4)
where it has to be noted, in addition to what was explained before, that the lower
truncation of the distributions follows the lower bounds of the respective integrals.
This is because I must ensure the volume adds up to one. In addition the order of
integration (rst , then ) is not trivial; since the signal occurs rst in time, I need to
know what probabilities of fooling are IC and not vice-versa.Appendix B
Model with only Firm-Selection
This is, in essence, a signaling model with human capital accumulation where workers
pay to become high skilled and obtain an, on average, higher signal. Firms then select
those with the highest signals to perform complex task. In the context of the double
screening model this case is constructed by the deletion of the detection technology.
This has two side eects, rst, no worker invited to perform complex tasks would turn
the oer down making FD = 1. In addition the rm has no incentive to pay money
ex-post, thus for simplicity I assume all money is paid ex-ante and wp is erased from
the problem.
To solve for the equilibrium I maximize the representative rm's prot function.
Given outside options f UH;  ULg and a belief with respect the workers' investment rate
e , the representative rm solves,
Max
 ;wc;ws P = Y ( ;w)   !( ;w) (B.1)
where the output is given by Y = A(C + (1   )S)
1
 and the eciency units are
dened as C = Ahe (1 Fh)+Al(1  e )(1 Fl) and S = e Fh +(1  e )Fl. The payroll
function also suer some modications,
!( ;w) = w
c (E[p()]I=1H
c + E[p()]I=0L
c)   w
sN
s (B.2)
Now I turn to the constraints of the problem. The IR constrains take the following
form:
 U
H  [1   Fh( )]V
h;c
E + Fh( )V
s IR:H (B.3)
 U
L  [1   Fl( )]V
l;c
E + Fl( )V
s IR:L (B.4)
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As for the IC constrains, the IC.L is never satised. This is because V h;c  V s implies
V l;c  V s.
V
h;c  V
s IC:H (B.5)
V
s  V
l;c(;); broken 8(;) IC:L (B.6)
The workers' investment rate it follows the same logic as in the main document. As
for the deceiving decisions every low skilled invited to do complex tasks accepts them
thus making FD = 1 and E[]D=1 = eta.Appendix C
Model with only Self-Selection
This appendix describes a model with only ex-post signals. In this setting rms set
a menu of contracts so that low skilled workers invited to perform the complex task
reveal their skill level and opt to take on the simple task. To achieve their aim, rms
condition part of the complex task wage on actual productivity that is paid ex-post.
Firms, through this mechanism, are able to nd out, with a certain degree of accuracy,
workers' productivity.
There are two ways to build this specication both yielding the same result. One
is assuming ex-ante signals still exist but are meaningless (i.e. both ex-ante signals
cdf's have the same distribution), in which case every worker has a Bayesian posterior
probability of having invested equal to 0.5. The second one, and the one I follow,
simplies even further the problem and assumes ex-ante signals do not exist at all.
This forces rms to invite a random sample of the applicants to the complex task.
Given outside options f UH;  ULg and a belief with respect the workers' investment
rate in human capital, e , the rm solves,
Max
 ;wc;ws P = Y ( ;w)   !( ;w) (C.1)
where the output is given by Y = A(C + (1   )S)
1
 and the eciency units are
dened as C = Ahe  +Al (1 e )FD and S = e (1  )+(1 e )(1  )+ (1 e )[1 FD].
The payroll function also suers some modications,
!( ;w) = w
cN
c   w
p (H
c + E[jD = 1]L
c)   w
sN
s (C.2)
Constraints: Finally I need to dene 2 individual rationality and 2 incentive com-
patibility constraints. With regards to the Individial Rationality constraints I have,
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 U
H   V
h;c + (1    )V
s IR.H (C.3)
 U
L   V
l;c
E [1   F( )] +  V
sF( ) + (1    )V
s IR.L (C.4)
A key dierence arises in comparison to the FS specication with regards to the
IC.L constraint. While in the FS specication all low skilled workers invited to perform
a complex task accept it, in the SS specication some reveal their skill level and opt
out to perform the simple task.
V
h;c  V
s IC.H (C.5)
V
s = V
l;c( ) IC.L (C.6)
The IC.L holds true for all  <   meaning there will be a semi-separating equilibrium.
Workers investment decisions are not modied. As for the deceiving decision all workers
with a fooling probability higher than the deceiving threshold   will deceive. The
threshold is calculated as follows,
  =

V s
V l;c
 1
(C.7)
provided the inverse of V l;c exists.Appendix D
Model with perfect information
This appendix shows how to work out the model presented in chapter 1 if rms were
able to observe with certainty, and ex-ante, whether a worker has invested in his human
capital or not. Note this extra information clears out the informational asymmetry from
the model.
The maximization problem that rms face varies slightly. One of the novelties lies on
rms not worrying about low skilled workers potentially performing the complex task .
In addition, I simplify the model further by eliminating the performance payment, wp,
because rms know ex-ante the performance of every worker and there is no reason to
withhold payments.
Given outside options f UH;  ULg and a belief with respect the workers' investment
rate in human capital, e , the rm solves,
Max
 ;wc;ws P = Y ( ;w)   !( ;w); (D.1)
where the output is given by Y = A(C + (1   )S)
1
 and the eciency units are
dened as C = Ahe   and S = e (1    ) + (1   e ). The payroll simplies to just
!( ;w) = w
cN
c   w
sN
s: (D.2)
Constraints Both Incentive Compatibility constraint are now missing because work-
ers cannot pretend to be a dierent type. I am left with the 2 Individual rationality
constraints.
 U
H  V
h;c IR.H (D.3)
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 U
L  V
s IR.L (D.4)Appendix E
Constrained planner
I build a benevolent planner constrained to take into account the lack of knowledge
about the workers' type. This planner cares about the society's welfare and maximizes
total utility by choosing wages a hiring threshold and the investment rate of the society.
The latter can be done because the planne controls the incentive to invest and knows
the shape of the investment cost cdf.
Max
 ;wc;wp;ws;
W = W
h;cH
c + W
l;cL
c + W
sN
s  
Z 
l
F()d (E.1)
where total welfare W is constructed as the addition of the high skilled and low skilled
individual welfare1 weighted by their size in the society minus the total cost of in-
vestment. The total cost of investment can be added altogether because it enters the
individual utility functions linearly. The integral of the costs goes from the lower bound
of the cost distribution to the incentive to invest, , which is the highest investment
cost a worker would pay.
First the planner faces a feasibility constraint. The planner must ensure that the
earnings2 of the workers do not exceed what it is produced.
H
cE
h;c + L
cE
l;c + N
sE
s  Y (E.2)
where output is given by Y = A(C + (1   )S)
1
 and the eciency units are dened
exactly as in the DS model. Then I only add a set of IC constraints because the IR's
are subtituted by equation E.5,
V
h;c  V
s IC.H; and (E.3)
1Calculations for the welfare measure is shown in appendix G.
2Calculations for the earnings measure is shown in appendix G.
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V
s  V
l;c(;) for some ; IC.L: (E.4)
Lastly I add an equation that states the mass of workers who would invest in their
education,
 = F(): (E.5)
How to construct the incentive to invest, , is explained in chapter 1. Finally I also
refer the reader to chapter 1 to check how the deceiving decisions are calculated.Appendix F
Workers' utility maximization
problem.
In the main body of the thesis I state the workers' utility function and their liquidity
constraint. This appendix shows how the workers maximize their utility for a given
contract that pays some money ex-ante and some money ex-post, perhaps with uncer-
tainty.
F.1 Utility under certain payments
The utility obtained by high skilled workers in the complex task, with contract fp()wc;wp;Cg,
and any worker in the simple task, with contract fws;0;Sg, is known with certainty.
To solve for the optimal allocation, workers maximize the following function:
Max U (c
a;c
o) =
ca1    1
1   
+ 
co1    1
1   
(F.1)
subject to
c
a  w
a (F.2)
c
a + c
o = w
a + w
o (F.3)
The utility function evaluated at the optimum takes two values:
V =
8
> <
> :
wa1 
 1
1  +  wo1 
 1
1  if wa  wa+wo
1+1=

wa+wo
1+1=
1 
 1
1  + 

wa+wo
1+ 1=
1 
 1
1  if wa > wa+wo
1+1=
(F.4)
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F.2 Utility under uncertain payments
If the performance pay is uncertain, as it occurs to the low skilled workers when joining
the complex task, some precautionary savings will be taken as insurance against the
risk of not having anything when old. The maximization program for a given contract
fp()wc;wpjy = p;Cg is,
Max U
 
c
a;c
o;h;c
o;l
=
ca1    1
1   
+ 
"

co;h1 
  1
1   
+ (1   )
co;l1 
  1
1   
#
(F.5)
subject to
c
o;h = w
a + w
o   c
a (F.6)
c
o;l = w
a   c
a (F.7)
An analytical expression fr the value function is not easy to nd. Here I provide the
rst order condition that gives the optimum:
c
a 
= 
 
(w
a + w
o   c
a)
  + (1   )(w
a   c
a)
 
(F.8)
Once ca is known I can pin down future consumption using the constraints of the
problem. The value function is calculated as the utility function evaluated at the
optimum V = U(ca;co;h
;co;l
).Appendix G
Welfare and income measures
This appendix denes the measures of welfare and earnings used in chapter 1 and
appendix D. First I dene welfare by workers' occupation and skill. Then I turn to do
the same for the earnings measure.
G.1 Welfare
Using some previously dened objects I dene average welfare for high skilled and low
skilled workers, at each, the simple and the complex task. These calculation are for the
double screening specication. For high skilled workers doing the complex task, welfare
(net of investment costs) is:
W
h;c =
Z 1
 
V
h;c(p()w
c;w
p)fh(;  ;1)d: (G.1)
For the low skilled workers who deceive the rm I need to take into account the bias
produced by workers self-selecting:1
W
l;c =
Z 1
min
Z 1
min()
V
l;c(p()w
c;w
p;)fl(;
min;1)f(;
min;
h)dd (G.2)
The average welfare obtained by high or low skilled workers performing the simple task
is given by:
W
h;s = V
s; (G.3)
1Refer to Appendix A for information about the bounds of this integral.
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and total welfare in the economy is dened by the addition of all the partial welfare
measures minus the investment costs incurred by the high skilled workers,
W = H
cW
h;c + L
cW
l;c + N
sW
s  
Z 
l
Fd: (G.4)
G.2 Earnings
I do a similar exercise to compute workers' aggregate earnings. For high skilled workers
doing the complex task, earnings are given by:
E
h;c =
Z 1
 
p()w
cfh(;  ;1)d + w
p: (G.5)
For low skilled workers who deceive the rm I need to take into account the bias
produced by the self-selection2 of workers:
E
l;c =
Z 1
min
Z h
min()
w
pflfdd +
Z h
min
Z 1
min()
w
cp()flfdd: (G.6)
The earnings obtained by high skilled and low skilled doing simple tasks is given by:
E
h;s = w
s; (G.7)
and the total earnings in the economy are dened by the addition of all the partial
earnings measures weighted by the share of each group in the population,
E = H
cE
h;c + L
cE
l;c + N
sE
s: (G.8)
2Refer to Appendix A for information about the bounds of this integral.Appendix H
Identication of outside options for
competitive equilibria
H.1 Model with one group
To identify an equilibrium in the any one group model I need to nd the outside options
such that rms' prots are zero. The strategy I follow is to set  UL =  1 and search for
the  UH that makes prot equal to zero. In equilibrium, the value of  UL is determined
endogenously.
H.2 Model with 2 groups
There is an extra problem when solving for the competitive equilibrium whenever there
is more than 1 group. Even after I get rid of the IR.L constraints for low skilled1 I still
have to iterate over two numbers,  UH;w;  UH;b, until expected prot is 0.
The identication procedure goes as follows:
 Find the pair f UH;w
eq ;  UH;b
eq g such that 0 prot is obtained in a model where rms'
beliefs are the same for both groups.
 Set a new, discriminatory belief, e w > e b.
 If the resulting prot is negative make  UH;b smaller until P=0, holding  UH;w =
 UH;w
eq .
 If the resulting prot is positive make  UH;w higher until P=0, holding  UH;b =  UH;b
eq .
1Because they are not binding.
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